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Party Competition and
European Integration
in the East and West
Different Structure, Same Causality
Gary Marks
Liesbet Hooghe
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
and Free University Amsterdam
Moira Nelson
Erica Edwards
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
How does the ideological profile of a political party affect its support or oppo-
sition to European integration? The authors investigate this question with a
new expert data set on party positioning on European integration covering 171
political parties in 23 countries. The authors’ findings are (a) that basic struc-
tures of party competition in the East and West are fundamentally and ex-
plicably different and (b) that although the positions that parties in the East and
West take on European integration are substantively different, they share a
single underlying causality.
Keywords: European integration; political parties; ideological dimension;
Eastern Europe; communism; Western Europe
On May 1, 2004, eight former communist societies entered the EuropeanUnion, with two more anticipating membership by 2007. These are
decisive events in the stitching together of Europe after the demise of com-
munism. The prospect or experience of membership in the European Union
is the most effective means yet devised to disseminate and consolidate the
defining ideals of Western civilization—civil rights, markets, and democ-
racy. Enlargement is a geopolitical process extending Western norms, and
hence peace and economic growth, to bordering countries. But what are the
consequences of enlargement for the European polity? Do the East and the
West view the issues arising from European integration through the same or
different eyes?
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We ask two questions in this article. First, how does party positioning on
European issues connect to the basic conflicts that structure domestic poli-
tics? How does the ideological profile of a political party in national politics
constrain its support for European integration? And, second, does European
integration map onto domestic competition differently in the East and the
West, and if so, how can we make sense of this?
Prior research has shown that in the West, the structure of domestic com-
petition powerfully constrains attitudes on European integration (Aspinwall,
2002; Marks & Steenbergen, 2004; Pennings, 2002). The orientation of a
party to European issues can be predicted fairly accurately if one knows how
that party stands on the two dimensions that summarize domestic political
competition—an economic, Left/Right dimension and a noneconomic, new-
politics dimension.
Do these findings travel to Central and Eastern Europe? In recent years,
several researchers have analyzed the structure of political competition in the
accession states of Central and Eastern Europe. We draw on their research
and bring to bear an expert data set covering the EU-15 (minus Luxembourg)
and seven accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) plus
Bulgaria and Romania.1 This survey of 238 country experts was conducted in
2002 under the auspices of the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill
Center for European Studies and provides systematic data on party leader-
ship positioning on European integration and on nine EU policies for 98
Western and 73 Eastern political parties (see Appendix A for details).
Structure of Party Competition
Two dimensions structure competition among political parties in Europe.
The first is an economic Left/Right dimension concerned with economic
redistribution, welfare, and government regulation of the economy. The Left
prioritizes economic equality; the Right prioritizes individual economic
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Authors’ Note: For comments and advice, we are grateful to Geoffrey Evans, Evelyne Huber,
Herbert Kitschelt, Kenneth Scheve, Robert Rohrschneider, Donald Searing, Aneta
Spendzharova, Marco Steenbergen, John Stephens, Gabor Toka, Milada Vachudova, Stephen
Whitefield, and participants in conferences at Duke University, Indiana-Bloomington, Univer-
sity of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Halki conference in
Greece on “Redefining the European Project,” and the European Consortium for Political
Research Summer School on “Political Parties and Multi-Level Governance” in Rijs, the
Netherlands.
1. To avoid repetition, we use the labels Central and Eastern Europe, East, and accession
countries interchangeably, as we do Western Europe, West, and EU-15.
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freedom. Contestation on this dimension, expressed in democratic class con-
flict, has predominated in most Western nations in the postwar period
(Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) and is diagnosed as the
main dimension of party competition in Central and Eastern Europe (Evans
& Whitefield, 1993; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Toka, 1999).2
A second, noneconomic or cultural, new-politics dimension has gained
strength since the 1970s in Western Europe (Flanagan, 1987; Flanagan &
Lee, 2003; Franklin, 1992; Inglehart, 1977; Kitschelt, 1988). In Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, and Slovenia, it is almost as powerful as the economic
Left/Right, and in Hungary, it is stronger (Evans & Whitefield, 1993;
Klingemann, 1994; Zielinski, 2002). This dimension summarizes several
noneconomic issues—ecological, lifestyle, and communal—and is corre-
spondingly more diverse than the Left/Right dimension. In some countries, it
is oriented around environmental protection and sustainable growth; in oth-
ers, it captures conflict about traditional values rooted in a secular-religious
divide; and in yet others, it is pitched around immigration and defense of the
national community. Therefore, we describe the poles of this dimension with
composite terms: green/alternative/libertarian (Gal) and traditionalism/
authority/nationalism (Tan).3
These dimensions are best regarded as ways to summarize how actors
position themselves on major issues. The structure of political contestation
varies in interesting ways across countries and across time. But one can dis-
cern a basic, generalizable pattern, and it is with this that we concern our-
selves here.
In the West, there are strong affinities between Left and Gal and between
Right and Tan. The simple correlation between party positioning on these
dimensions is –0.64. Figure 1 splices political parties across four quadrants.
Of 98 political parties, 81 across the 14 larger EU countries are located in the
Left-Gal and Right-Tan quadrants. Eight of the remaining parties are liberal
parties drawn to the Right-Gal quadrant.
The same dimensions have been diagnosed in Central and Eastern
Europe, but the location of parties in this two-dimensional space could
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2. We use the concept “dimension” rather than “cleavage” because we are concerned with
the positioning of political actors rather than the extent to which their interests are socially rooted
or organizationally expressed (Bartolini, 2004, p. 3).
3. Gender and color connotations intended. The question with which we measure this, listed
in Appendix B, is biased toward the libertarian element in green/alternative/libertarian (Gal) and
the authoritarian element in traditionalism/authority/nationalism (Tan). This imposes a useful
conservatism in our analysis because these elements are the most distant from the sovereignty
aspects of European integration that, we argue, mobilize Gal/Tan concerns. Hence, the associa-
tion we find between support for European integration and Gal/Tan is not an artifact of our inclu-
sion of nationalism as an element in Tan.
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hardly be more different. The Left-Gal quadrant encompasses just five politi-
cal parties, and these are located around its southern and eastern edges (see
Figure 2). Of the 73 parties in the nine countries for which we have data, 50
are either Left-Tan or Right-Gal. The association between the two dimen-
sions is 0.45. As one would expect, given the relative newness of democratic
competition in the East, party competition is less structured there. But the
structure we do find yields an axis of party competition at a 90 degree angle
to that in the West (Evans & Whitefield, 1993; Kitschelt, 1992; Sitter, 2002).4
Why is this so? The answer lies in the contrasting ways communism and
liberal capitalism combine Left/Right and Gal/Tan (Kostelecky, 2002; Lane,
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Figure 1
Dimensions of Party Competition in Western Europe
Note: n = 98 parties. Weighted by vote.
4. The party scene in the aftermath of communism was chaotic. There were no firm links
between the ideological positions of voters or political parties, on one hand, and social structures
or basic values, on the other. Bernhard Wessels and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1994) use the term
flattened societies to describe the social flux that made it difficult for citizens to define their polit-
ical interests (Kostelecky, 2002, pp. 168-171). This led some to argue that the dimensionality of
the party system started from a tabula rasa and that first moves of party entrepreneurs might deci-
sively shape the structure of party competition (Zielinski, 2002). Most observers now agree that
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2002; Lawson, Roemmele, & Karasimeonov, 1999; Meyer, 2003). Commu-
nism, as it existed in Eastern Europe, was a Left-Tan phenomenon. Commu-
nist regimes delivered more economic equality than market economies and
suppressed public dissent and alternative lifestyles. Reform in these societies
has combined the demand for free markets and democratic opening of the
political process. Political parties that cater to transition losers try to blunt
reform by emphasizing its polar opposite—economic equality and tradi-
tional authority—and are, therefore, located in the lower-left quadrant of
Figure 3. Political parties that represent transition winners repudiate authori-
tarianism and state control over the economy precisely because they seek a
clean break with the past and gravitate to the upper-right quadrant.
This account is consistent with Herbert Kitschelt’s argument that the axis
of party competition reflects conflict between defenders and opponents of
Marks et al. / Party Competition 159
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Figure 2
Dimensions of Party Competition in Central and Eastern Europe
Note: n = 73 parties. Weighted by vote.
the structure of party competition in Central and Eastern Europe has become more stable and
predictable.
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existing property rights and modes of distribution (Kitschelt, 1992). Defend-
ers are reluctant to jeopardize the status quo by opening the political process
to new groups, and this leads them to limit political participation by stressing
traditional values and exclusionary notions of political community. Hence,
in the West, where the status quo is capitalism, there is an affinity between the
promarket Right and authoritarian or (in our words) Tan values and between
the Left, which favors political regulation, and libertarian or Gal values. In
Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, defenders of nonmarket distribution
are Tan and those anticipating benefits from marketization are Gal.
We gain an interesting line of sight into the East-West contrast when we
compare the positions of party families.5 Social democrats, Christian demo-
crats, conservatives, liberals, and regionalist or ethnic parties have similar
positions in the East and the West. These party families are located within the
small ovals in Figure 3. Three party families—the radical Left, the agrarians,
160 Comparative Political Studies
5. Our categorization of Western parties follows the conventional classification we use in
previous analyses (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Marks & Wilson, 2000). For Eastern par-
ties, we follow (a) Derksen’s categorization of party families (http://www.electionworld.org)
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Dimensions of Party Competition in East and West
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and the radical Tan—have contrasting locations in our two-dimensional
schema. Their divergent positions are indicated by arrows. These families are
mainly responsible for the sharp, indeed 90 degree, difference in the axes of
party competition.
All three party families are drawn toward the bottom-left corner of Figure
3 in the East. Why? Not because they are attracted to communism. These
party families include nationalist and religious parties that have little sympa-
thy for communism. The Left-Tan quadrant attracts these parties because it is
most removed from liberal-democratic capitalism. The Left-Tan quadrant
is the quadrant of transition losers—the rural, the elderly, non–English
speakers, the poorly educated, the unemployed, and the manual workers
(Chicowski, 2000; Grzymala-Busse & Innes, 2003; Kitschelt et al., 1999;
Tucker, Pacek, & Berinsky, 2002). Aside from their shared rejection of the
brave new world of liberal-democratic capitalism, such people are diverse.
Some are motivated primarily to defend traditional or religious values
against secular cosmopolitanism, some wish to defend their nation against
intrusive internationalization, and some are desperate to find political protec-
tion from impersonal market forces. But all are deeply suspicious of change
to their communal status quo.
It is worth noting that the mix of Left opposition to international capital-
ism and Tan opposition to secular cosmopolitanism varies, as do the kinds
of political parties that draw support from the disaffected. In Hungary, for
example, national issues are salient. The main axis of competition is tilted
vertically on the Gal/Tan dimension, and the Left-Tan quadrant is contested
by a small virulently nationalist Hungarian Justice and Life Party and Fidesz,
which has veered in a Tan direction in the past few years. In the Czech
Republic, by contrast, the axis of party competition has a Left/Right slant.
The Left-Tan quadrant is dominated by an unreformed communist party, the
KSCM, which demands protection for those threatened by economic liberal-
ization. Hungary and the Czech Republic are extreme cases in which one or
the other dimension of competition predominates. In most Central and East-
ern European countries, some mix of radical Tan parties, agrarian parties,
confessional parties, and former communist parties vies for the support of
the disaffected.
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and (b) the affiliations of Central and Eastern European countries’parties to European or interna-
tional party families and to party groups in the European Parliament. Six political parties are
uncoded. Party families in the East are not as coherent on the Left/Right and Gal/Tan dimensions
as those in the West, but the difference is not large. The average standard deviation across Eastern
party families on the two dimensions is 1.21 on an 11-point scale; for Western party families, it is
1.15.
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Party Positioning on
European Integration in Western Europe
The general structuring of party competition allows one to explain party
positioning on European integration with some precision. But the predictive
power of Left/Right and Gal/Tan varies across the East and West. We begin
with the West, where European integration has been on the political agenda
for decades and where we have a decade-long research program on which to
draw.
Bipolar Euro-Skepticism
The relationship between a party’s position along the axis of party compe-
tition and its level of support for European integration is nonlinear in the
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Figure 4
Dimensions of Party Competition and Position on
European Integration in Western Europe
Note: n = 98 parties. On a scale from 1 (strongly opposed to European integration) to 7 (strongly
in favor), supportive parties have a score between 4.5 and 7; neutral parties have a score between
3.51 and 4.49; opposing parties score between 1 and 3.5.
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West. Figure 4 provides a bird’s eye view of support, neutrality, and opposi-
tion to European integration among parties placed in the two-dimensional
space represented in earlier figures. The pattern revealed here is stark. Oppo-
sition to European integration is bipolar; it is located at both Left and Tan
extremes. When we tap extremism, measured by squaring the distance from
the median party on Left/Right and Gal/Tan, this boosts the fit of a model
explaining party positioning on European integration from 18% to 45% (see
Table 1).
The reason for this is that the European Union is a centrist project
(Aspinwall, 2002; Hix & Lord, 1997; Marks, Wilson, & Ray, 2002; Taggart,
1998). The European Union has been created by mainstream parties—
Christian democrats, liberals, social democrats, and conservatives—which
have dominated national governments, national parliaments, the European
Parliament, and the European Commission. Many noncentrist parties attack
European integration as an extension of their domestic opposition. The radi-
cal Left views European integration as an elitist capitalist project that isolates
decision making from citizens in the interests of powerful corporations. Rad-
ical Tan parties view European integration as an elitist supranational project
that weakens national autonomy and traditional values.
Left/Right
The connections between domestic and European contestation come into
sharp focus when one disaggregates European integration into its component
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Table 1
West Versus East: Left/Right, Gal/Tan, Extremism,
and Party Position on European Integration
West East
Linear Nonlinear Linear Nonlinear
Model Model Model Model
Constant 6.06 (.112) 6.95 (.103) 6.70 (.165) 7.30 (.152)
Left/Right 0.29 (.024) 0.35 (.020) 0.19 (.019) 0.17 (.016)
Gal/Tan –0.38 (.023) –0.44 (.019) –0.34 (.018) –0.34 (.016)
Left/Right extremism –0.16 (.008) –0.07 (.007)
Gal/Tan extremism –0.08 (.007) –0.06 (.006)
R2 .18 .45 .48 .59
n 98 98 73 73
Note: Ordinary least square regressions. Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard
errors in parentheses. Weighted by vote. Gal = green/alternative/libertarian; Tan = traditionalism/
authority/nationalism.
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policies. The Left/Right dimension constrains party positioning on policies
having to do with the political regulation of the market, including social pol-
icy, employment policy, and cohesion policy (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson,
2002; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1997). These policies—summarized by the
term regulated capitalism—were promoted by Jacques Delors during his
decade-long presidency of the European Commission (1985-1994) and
became the project of the Center Left in its attempt to create a “citizens’
Europe” to counterbalance liberal market reforms (Ross, 1995). Regulated
capitalism is opposed by the economic Right for whom market integration is
a final destination rather than a point of departure. The Left/Right divide in
domestic politics constrains the positions that political parties take on com-
peting versions of capitalism in Europe (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hooghe &
Marks, 1999; Pollack, 1999; Rhodes & van Apeldoorn, 1997).
The data presented in Table 2 are consistent with this. Support for Euro-
pean employment policy tends to increase among parties on the Left (R =
–0.53), whereas support for the internal market tends to increase among par-
ties on the Right (R = 0.34).6 If a party is one unit to the right on our 11-point
scale, it will be an estimated 0.20 more favorably oriented to the internal mar-
ket on our 7-point scale.7
New Politics
EU issues that engage lifestyle, gender, environment, participatory deci-
sion making, and national culture are most closely related to the new-politics
dimension. The location of a party on the Gal/Tan dimension is strongly
associated with its support for an EU environmental policy (R = –0.62), for
an EU asylum policy (R = –0.46), and for strengthening the powers of the
European Parliament (R = –0.50). As Table 2 reveals, the Gal/Tan divide is
considerably more powerful than Left/Right in predicting party positioning
across most policy areas.
Those committed to Tan values oppose European integration for the same
reasons that they oppose immigration: Both infuse foreigners into the soci-
ety, and both threaten the national community. The Vlaams Blok’s campaign
slogan in the 2004 regional and European elections was “less taxes, more
Flanders; less crime, more Flanders; less immigration, more Flanders”—an
update of its “Safe Flanders” in the 2003 Belgian elections. The central plank
of the party platform in the regional elections was opposition to immigrant
164 Comparative Political Studies
6. We assume that larger parties have a larger impact on the structure of competition. So, in
this and following analyses, we weigh party positions by the percentage of votes a party receives
in the national election in the survey year or the nearest prior year. Our results are robust across
weighted and nonweighted analyses.
7. The unstandardizedcoefficient of the regression is 0.196, and its standard error is 0.015.
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voting rights. In its 2004 European election program, the Vlaams Blok sup-
ported “an intergovernmental EU” and was opposed to “European citizen-
ship and a European Constitution as proposed by the European Convention.
Only states can decide who their subjects are. The EU is no state and should
never become one.”8
Defense of national sovereignty lies close to the hearts of those on the Tan
side. In this, they are different from market liberals. Market liberals view
national sovereignty in terms of its implications for economic exchange.
Radical Tan parties defend national sovereignty as an intrinsic value.
Radical Tan parties are the most Euro-skeptical party family in the West.
Their average position on European integration is 2.5 on a 7-point scale,
compared with 3.3 for radical Left parties and 5.6 for all Western European
parties. Conservative parties that lean to the Tan side of the new-politics
dimension tend to be considerably more Euro-skeptical than those that do
not. Conversely, Gal values are consistent with support for European integra-
tion. Green parties are the most Euro-enthusiastic party family in the West on
EU environmental policy and for more powers to the European Parliament.
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Table 2
West Versus East: Left/Right, Gal/Tan, and Party Position
on European Policies
West East
Left/Right Gal/Tan Left/Right Gal/Tan
European integration 0.04 –0.30 0.52 –0.65
European Parliament powers –0.17 –0.50 0.32 –0.57
Internal market policy 0.34 –0.18 0.64 –0.68
Employment policy –0.53 –0.55 0.12 –0.53
Agricultural policy 0.11 0.29 –0.48 0.30
Cohesion policy –0.25 –0.18 0.18 –0.30
Environmental policy –0.59 –0.62 0.11 –0.27
Asylum policy –0.23 –0.46 0.24 –0.56
Foreign and security policy 0.04 –0.33 0.38 –0.57
Enlargement –0.11 –0.38 0.59 –0.71
Note: Bivariate correlations for 98 Western and 73 Central and Eastern European parties.
Weighted by vote. Gal = green/alternative/libertarian; Tan = traditionalism/authority/
nationalism.
8. See http://www.vlaamsblok2004.be/pdf/europa.pdfVlaamsblok.be (accessed July 18,
2004).
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Party Positioning on European Integration
in Central and Eastern Europe
Unipolar Euro-Skepticism
As in the West, Euro-skepticism in Central and Eastern Europe is preva-
lent among radical Left parties and among radical Tan parties. But, in con-
trast to the West, radical Left and radical Tan values tend to combine in the
same parties. So, as Figure 5 illustrates, Euro-skepticism in the East is unipo-
lar. A simple model with two linear variables tapping Left/Right and Gal/Tan
captures 48% of the variance in party positioning on European integration
(Table 1).9 Variables tapping extremism increase the proportion of variation
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Figure 5
Dimensions of Party Competition and Position on European
Integration in Central and Eastern Europe
Note: n = 73 parties. On a scale from 1 (strongly opposed to European integration) to 7 (strongly
in favor), supporting parties have a score between 4.5 and 7; neutral parties have a score between
3.51 and 4.49; opposing parties have a score between 1 and 3.5.
9. These two dimensions are far more powerful than national location. ANOVA analysis of
general support for European integration using national dummy variables explains 8.6% of vari-
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explained, but the effect is smaller than in the West. When we add variables
to capture the nonlinear effect of extremism, the coefficient of determination
increases to 59%.
Left/Right and Gal/Tan
Party positioning on European integration reflects—and reinforces—the
axis of party competition in Central and Eastern Europe. Right-Gal parties
tend to support European integration; Left-Tan parties tend to be skeptical.
Socioeconomic interests underpin this. European integration gains the
support of economic winners, the very people who support Right-Gal par-
ties. Those who voted “yes” in accession referenda tend to be more affluent,
educated, and professional than those who voted against (Pienkos, 2004,
p. 469; Tverdova & Anderson, 2004). Those who feel that they are economic
losers, or who lack the skills to take advantage of new market opportunities,
are more likely to oppose European integration and to support parties in the
Left-Tan quadrant (Chicowski, 2000; Tucker, Pacek, & Berinsky, 2002).
In Poland, opponents of European integration support the Peasants Self-
Defense Party headed by Andrej Lepper, or the Catholic, nationalistic,
League of Polish Families, with its close association to the Catholic funda-
mentalist radio station Marya (Szczerbiak, 2001; see also Batory & Sitter,
2004). In Hungary, Euro-skepticism has established roots in the radical Tan
and the former communist Left: The Far Right Justice and Life Party and the
Far Left Hungarian Workers Party are hard-core Euro-skeptic parties
(Batory, 2001; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004). Sim-
ilarly, in Slovakia, opposition against European integration is pronounced
among the radical Tan (Slovak National Party and the Right Slovak National
Party) and the radical Left (Slovak Communist Party). All but 1 of 16 Euro-
skeptic or neutral parties (i.e., those scoring below 4.5 on our 7-point scale
for general support of European integration) are located in the Left-Tan
quadrant. The sole exception is the Czech ODS (Obcanska Demokraticka
Strana), the Civic Democratic Party of former prime minister and current
president Vaclav Klaus, which is located in the Right-Gal quadrant and is
depicted as neutral by our experts.10
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ance among parties in the East and 10.4% in the West. With respect to European integration, one
can say that political parties are much more diverse within than among countries. Similarly, party
family is a much better discriminator for party position on European integration than is country.
The standard deviation of party positions on European integration tends to be considerably larger
within individual countries than within individual party families.
10. Klaus’s Euro-skepticism appears rooted in his neoliberal opposition to particular poli-
cies, such as agricultural and cohesion policy, rather than in generalized disapproval of the pro-
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All of this suggests that contention on European integration in Central and
Eastern Europe is aligned with the major dimension of political conflict.
Opponents and proponents agree that EU membership is a step toward a
democratic capitalist society. The formal conditions imposed by the Euro-
pean Union on candidate countries, the so-called Copenhagen criteria,
require both a market economy and institutional guarantees for transparent
democracy and minority protection (Vachudova, 2005)—in short, policies
associated with the Right-Gal quadrant of Figure 5. As Karen Henderson
observes, “The EU makes demands of candidate states which coincide with
the aims of parties at the pro-market libertarian end of the axis” (Henderson,
2001, p. 10). From the early 1990s, this has included the successors of sev-
eral reformist communist parties, such as the Polish SLD (Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej), which supports European integration “to demonstrate its
repudiation of the past” (Pienkos, 2004, p. 464), the Hungarian MSzP (Mag-
yar Szocialista Part), the Slovenian ZLSD (Zdrucena Lista Socialnih
Demokratov), and several parties in the Baltic republics.
In Western Europe, European integration highlights tensions in the domi-
nant Left-Gal/Right-Tan axis of party competition, and this limits the extent
to which political parties can absorb European integration. By contrast,
European integration fits hand in glove with the Left-Tan/Right-Gal axis in
Central and Eastern Europe, and this explains why positioning on European
integration is more structured in the East than in the West.
Issue Bundling
It is one thing for a party to take a position on European integration from
the outside, as political parties in the East have done. It is another thing for a
party to take a position from the inside, confronted with decisions on whether
and how to pursue integration on several fronts, as has been the situation for
political parties in the West.
From the outside, European integration is perceived as a bundle, a take-it-
or-leave-it proposition on membership. This is what we find in Central and
Eastern Europe prior to enlargement. Here, contestation reflects different
world views—“cosmopolitan opening” versus “national closure” (Batory,
2001, p. 6).
The SDKU (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union), Slovakia’s main
rightist party and government party since 2002, is staunchly promarket,
pro–civil liberties, and pro-European. It “considers membership in the Euro-
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cess itself. This is to say that the ODS unbundles European integration, as do conservative parties
in the West.
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pean Union and NATO as a possibility to speed up the modernisation of the
country” (see http://www.sdkuonline.sk/english/policy.php3, accessed on
August 24, 2005). The orthodox communist KSS (Komunisticka Strana
Slovenska) defends a diametrically opposite view not because it protests
against particular policies but on the basis of its claim that capitalism has
been worse than socialism for Slovakia (Dauderstädt & Joerissen, 2004,
p. 13). The same tension characterizes the EU debate in Hungary. “Asked
what kind of European Union Hungary hopes for, the EU integration website
(of the Hungarian Socialist party, the MSzP) answers that Hungary wants an
efficient, transparent, and open EU” (Dauderstädt & Joerissen, 2004, p. 18).
The party explains that “in the view of the Socialists, there is no other way of
modernization for Hungary and more broadly Central Europe than joining
the process of European integration as soon as possible, voluntarily giving up
part of sovereignty and transferring that to the institutions of European
integration” (quoted in Batory, 2001, p. 19).
As membership becomes a daily reality, we predict that issue bundling
will decrease. Already, we see that despite their general support for European
integration, Right-Gal parties tend not to favor an integrated agricultural pol-
icy—a policy designed for a constituency that provides them relatively few
votes. The same logic suggests that despite their general Euro-skepticism,
Left parties will tend to respond positively to European employment policy.
However, we also predict that party positioning on European integration will
continue to be structured by the Right-Gal versus Left-Tan divide so long as
the European Union is perceived as a supranational polity that enhances mar-
ket capitalism and cosmopolitan values.11
Conclusion
The theory of party positioning developed for Western European political
parties does, indeed, apply to Central and Eastern Europe. That is to say, the
positions that parties take on European integration are coherently, and sys-
tematically, related to the positions they take on the Left/Right and Gal/Tan
dimensions of contestation that structure domestic politics. But the outcome
could hardly be more different.
In the West, there are two main sources of opposition to European integra-
tion: the hard Left and the hard Tan. These are located at opposite extremes of
the axis of party competition. Left parties, such as the Swedish Vänster-
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ership and integration, where the authors find that support is best explained by ideological com-
mitments to market ideals (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2004).
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partiet or the Portuguese Coligacao Democratica Unitaria, oppose the
market implications of European integration. They view integration as a
Trojan horse for international capitalism. Tan parties, such as the Danske
Folkepartiet or the French Front National, oppose European integration
because they wish to defend national sovereignty. They believe that Euro-
pean integration undermines national communities.
The causal logic linking Left/Right and Gal/Tan to support or opposition
to European integration gives rise to powerful tensions within Western par-
ties. Parties that are Left tend to be Gal; parties that are Right tend to be Tan.
So the underlying sources of opposition to European integration are spread
across the map, as are the sources of support. The conflicts that arise from
this are particularly acute for conservative parties, several of which are rifted
between nationalism and market liberalism. The logic of party positioning
on European integration is combustible when it is overlaid on the axis of
party competition that distinguishes Western Europe.
The logic of support and opposition to European integration is the same in
Central and Eastern Europe, but it interacts with an axis of party competition
that is orthogonal to that in the West. The result is that opposition to Euro-
pean integration is concentrated among a single set of hard Left, hard Tan
parties. Conflicts over European integration mimic the basic conflicts that
structure these societies. The chief source of internal party conflict arises not
from contending ideological pressures, as in the West, but from the new
choices and constraints implied by membership.
European integration shakes and moves parties in a strikingly similar
fashion across Europe. But because the domestic dimensions of competi-
tion—Left/Right and Gal/Tan—intersect so differently in the East and the
West, a single causal logic of European integration produces distinctive pat-
terns of party support and opposition.
Appendix A
The analysis undertaken in this article is based on a data set gathered under the aus-
pices of the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill Center for European Studies.
A survey conducted in 2002 by a team of faculty and graduate students (Liesbet
Hooghe, Milada Vachudova, Erica Edwards, Moira Nelson, Gary Marks, Marco
Steenbergen, and David Scott) tapped 238 country experts—scholarly specialists on
political parties or European politics—to evaluate the ideological and policy lo-
cations of 171 political parties in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and all EU member states except
Luxembourg.
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The survey replicates and expands an expert survey of party positioning on Euro-
pean integration conducted in 1999 by the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill
Center for European Studies and in 1996 by Leonard Ray at four different time points:
1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 (http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks; Ray, 1999). Both of
these surveys were limited to EU member states.
Three sets of questions in the 2002 survey attempt to illuminate policy positions,
internal party dissent, and dimensions of contestation. First is a set of questions that
tap the degree of support across parties for European integration in general and in the
following policy areas: EU environmental policy, EU cohesion or regional policy, EU
policy toward asylum seekers, EU employment policy, EU agricultural spending,
internal market, EU foreign and security policy, expanding the European Parliament’s
power, and EU enlargement. Second are two questions that tap the extent of dissent
within parties, as well as on type of issues. Third are questions that tap party positions
on basic dimensions of political contestation, including an economic Left/Right scale
and a new-politics scale.
Political parties are included in the survey if they fulfill one or more of the follow-
ing criteria:
• The party received 3% or more of the vote in the general election for the lower
chamber in 2002 or the most proximate prior year.
• The party was represented in the lower chamber of the legislature in 2002.
• The party was represented in the European Parliament in 2002.
The 238 carefully selected experts have recognized expertise on the political par-
ties in a particular country—normally, but not always, their country of citizenship.
They completed a detailed questionnaire, which can be consulted at http://www.unc
.edu/~hooghe (three respondents submitted invalid responses). Our estimate of each
party’s position on each of these questions is the mean of the country experts’
evaluations.
The extent to which expert evaluations are reliable can be gauged by examining
the mean standard deviations. Table A1 presents standard deviations in responses to
two key questions and suggests that the current survey is within range of the 1984 to
1996 Ray data. The Ray data are comparable to the Huber and Inglehart (1995) and
the Laver and Hunt (1992) data. For a cross-validation of expert data with other data
on party positioning, including manifesto data, European election survey data, and an
elite survey, see Steenbergen and Marks (in press) and Marks, Hooghe, Steenbergen,
and Bakker (in press).
Table A1
Mean Standard Deviations of Expert Evaluations
1984 1988 1992 1996 2002
Party position 0.97 0.90 0.82 0.82 0.82
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Appendix B
Description of the Variables
Position on European Integration: Mean expert score along a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (strongly opposed to European integration) to 7 (strongly in favor of Euro-
pean integration). Question: “How would you describe the general position on
European integration that the party’s leadership has taken over the course of
2002?”
Left/Right Position: Mean expert score on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (extreme
Left) to 10 (extreme Right). Question: “Political scientists often classify parties in
terms of their ideological stance on economic issues. Parties to the right empha-
size a reduced economic role for government. They want privatization, lower
taxes, less regulation, reduced government spending, and a leaner welfare state.
Parties to the left want government to play an active role in the economy. Using
these criteria, indicate where parties are located in terms of their economic
ideology.”
Gal/Tan Position: Mean expert score on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (libertarian/
postmaterialist) to 10 (traditional/authoritarian). This score is reversed in Fig-
ures 1-5. Question: “Parties may also be classified in terms of their views on demo-
cratic freedoms and rights. “Libertarian” or “post-materialist” parties favor ex-
panded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, doctor-assisted
suicide, same-sex marriages, and greater democratic participation. “Traditional”
or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order and stability,
and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority. Where are par-
ties located in terms of their ideological views on freedoms and rights?”
Left/Right Extremism: Square of the distance of a party from the median Left/Right
position, calculated separately for Eastern and Western parties.
Gal/Tan Extremism: Square of the distance of a party from the median Left/Right
position, calculated separately for Eastern and Western parties.
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